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Relying on some auxiliary assumptions, usually considered mild, Bell’s theorem
proves that no local theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics.
In this work, we introduce a fully local, superdeterministic model that, by explicitly
violating settings independence—one of these auxiliary assumptions, requiring statisti-
cal independence between measurement settings and systems to be measured—is able
to reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. Moreover, we show that, con-
trary to widespread expectations, our model can break settings independence without
an initial state that is too complex to handle, without visibly losing all explanatory
power and without outright nullifying all of experimental science. Still, we argue that
our model is unnecessarily complicated and does not offer true advantages over its non-
local competitors. We conclude that, while our model does not appear to be a viable
contender to their non-local counterparts, it provides the ideal framework to advance
the debate over violations of statistical independence via the superdeterministic route.
Aclaró que un Aleph es uno de los puntos
del espacio que contienen todos los puntos.
—Jorge Luis Borges
...il s’ensuit, que cette communication va à quelque distance que ce soit.
Et par conséquent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l’univers;
tellement que celui qui voit tout, pourrait lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout...
—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
1 Introduction
John Bell proved that no local theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum me-
chanics [6, 7, 8, 10]. A few years later, Alan Aspect performed the relevant experiments
[5, 4] and showed the quantum predictions to be correct. Over time, more thorough
experiments have been performed [44, 18, 34, 23], and virtually all experimental loop-
holes have been examined and eliminated. Since local theories do not make correct
predictions for actual experiments, the most sensible conclusion is that our universe
features non-local aspects. This, we hold, is the most reasonable way of interpreting
Bell’s result.
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This position, however, has not been universally accepted. Despite both the va-
lidity and simplicity of Bell’s theorem, it is not hard to find opposition and, in some
cases, blatant misconceptions surrounding it. Some authors have (often erroneously)
argued that their particular version of quantum theory escapes the non-locality of Bell’s
theorem.1 Others have contested the validity of the non-locality conclusion by calling
attention to the presence in the theorem’s proof of certain implicit auxiliary assump-
tions. As a result, premises that in other contexts have been used and considered
uncontroversial, in this context have been brought to center stage, and in some way
or another challenged. The real reason behind the inconsistency, it is argued, is not
locality, but one of these implicit assumptions. If that is the case, locality would not
have to be rejected as a strict principle of physics, in spite of Bell’s work.
The recognition that Bell’s theorem makes an assumption regarding the statistical
independence between settings of measuring devices and systems to be measured—an
assumption we call settings independence2—is nothing new. It was acknowledged in
many places by Bell himself and discussed explicitly in [9]. Nevertheless, he and others
have argued that negating settings independence leads to unreasonable theories because
it seems to imply a massive conspiracy that would jeopardize all of experimental science.
Still, in recent years it has been argued that one could reasonably avoid Bell’s theorem,
and hence have a local theory which makes correct predictions, by denying settings
independence [40, 33, 32, 45].3 However, proponents of these ideas do not seem to have
successfully addressed the opposition, nor have they been able to provide a concrete
model that does the trick—that is, a concrete local model, compatible with all quantum
predictions. In the absence of such a model, and given the strong arguments against
it, the idea of rejecting settings independence remains as far-fetched as ever.
In this work we present a concrete, fully local model (and some variations thereof)
that, by violating settings independence via the superdeterministic path, is able to
reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. Our main objective is to provide
a concrete framework where the debate over violations of statistical independence via
superdeterminism could move forward. In that spirit, we describe our model in detail
1In the context of Everettian Interpretations, see [43]; in the context of Consistent Histories, see
[21]; in that of Relational Quantum Mechanics, see [36].
2This assumption has also been called measurement independence, statistical independence or the
no-conspiracy, free will or free choice assumption.
3In fact, a rather extensive and vigorous discussion has been taking place online between strong
advocates of rejecting settings independence, mainly Gerard t’Hooft, and strong detractors, especially
Tim Maudlin. Such an exchange has been an important motivator for this work.
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and try to defend it from the standard objections against superdeterministic models.
We also explore additional potential problems and discuss potential lines of defense as
well as possible counterarguments.
To all do this, our manuscript is organized as follows. In section 2, we start with
an overview of Bell’s theorem. We pay special attention to details that will be relevant
for the settings independence discussion later on. In section 3, we analyze in depth
the settings independence assumption and present the case for it. Then, we explore
superdeterminism as a path to rejecting such an assumption and discuss the worries
associated with such a path. Next, in section 4, we present the details of what we call
the local pilot-wave model, a fully local model compatible with all quantum predictions,
and, in section 5, we explore its reasonableness and viability. We find that, while our
model fares significantly better than expected regarding worries usually attributed
to violations of settings independence, it does give rise to a number of unforeseen
difficulties. Moreover, we point out that it performs poorly regarding theoretical virtues
such as simplicity, convenience and clarity. In the end, we conclude that, while the
proposed model does not succeed in providing an interesting contender to their non-
local counterparts, it provides the ideal framework to advance the debate over violations
of statistical independence via superdeterminism.
2 Bell’s theorem
We start this section with an overview of Bell’s theorem (see [28, 19] for thorough
discussions). Then we make a few comments regarding the relation between locality
and factorizability that will be relevant for the settings independence discussion later
on.
2.1 The inequality
Consider an ensemble of pairs of particles, all created in the state that quantum me-
chanics describes as a singlet. Particles of each pair are sent to two spatially separated
locations, 1 and 2, where spin measurements are to be performed. Let a, b denote the
spin directions measured in 1 and 2, respectively, and let A,B stand for the correspond-
ing results (with spin-up corresponding to +1 and spin-down to −1). Denote by λ the
complete, fundamental, state of each pair; that is, λ contains complete information
regarding all fundamental properties of the pair. If quantum mechanics is complete, λ
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is the wave function; if it is not, then λ could be the wave function supplemented with
extra information or it could be something entirely different. No assumption regard-
ing the nature of λ is made. In particular, one does not impose for λ to necessarily
constitute “hidden variables” that complete standard quantum mechanics, nor that the
fundamental model is deterministic.
As one is interested in exploring the viability of local models, one assumes, with
Bell, that the description under consideration is local. In particular, one assumes that
the probabilities P (A,B|a, b, λ) predicted by the model for the experiments in question
are such that
P (A,B|a, b, λ) = P (A|a, λ)P (B|b, λ) . (1)
This condition, usually referred to as factorizability, was introduced by Bell to capture
the idea that, for local theories, all correlations between distant systems must be locally
explicable. That is, once one conditionalizes on the complete state λ, correlations
between distant measurements disappear.
Next, one notes that the set of measured systems must be characterized by some
(normalized) distribution over its fundamental states—call such a distribution ρ(λ).
The point is that, even though all measured pairs are described, from a quantum point
of view, by the same state (i.e., a singlet), the complete description given by λ may
very well change from pair to pair. After all, we have control over the quantum state,
but not over the underlying fundamental state λ. One assumes that the distribution
ρ(λ) and the settings a and b are statistically independent:
ρ(λ|a, b) = ρ(λ); (2)
we call this condition settings independence (SI). Intuitively, this assumption entails
that the settings a, b and λ are not correlated. In the next section, we dive deeply
into the meaning of SI and the implications that come from denying it. For now, it
is sufficient to say that, on the surface, the assumption seems reasonable because one
can set up things in such a way that the settings of the detectors can be chosen before,
during or after the particle generator has emitted the pair of particles, and they can
be chosen in a myriad of extravagant and convoluted ways. Moreover, an analogous
assumption is universally accepted, albeit implicitly, in all experimental scenarios across
all sciences.
Given these assumptions, it can be shown that the expectation value of the product
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AB over the whole ensemble,
E(a, b) =
∫ ∑
A,B
AB Pr(A,B|a, b, λ) ρ(λ|a, b) dλ, (3)
necessarily obeys
|E(a, b) + E(a, b′) + E(a′, b)− E(a′, b′)| ≤ 2. (4)
That is, all local models must satisfy this inequality. This, in a nutshell, is Bell’s
theorem.
It is instructive to review the proof of the theorem. Using the assumptions in Eqs.
(1) and (2), one rewrites Eq. (3) as
E(a, b) =
∫ ∑
A,B
AB Pr(A,B|a, b, λ) ρ(λ|a, b) dλ
=
∫ ∑
A,B
AB Pr(A|a, λ) Pr(B|b, λ) ρ(λ) dλ
=
∫ [∑
A
APr(A|a, λ)
][∑
B
B Pr(B|a, λ)
]
ρ(λ) dλ
=
∫
A¯(a, λ) B¯(b, λ)ρ(λ) dλ
(5)
with A¯(a, λ) and B¯(b, λ) the expressions in the square brackets of the third line above.
Next, one considers
E(a, b)± E(a, b′) =
∫
A¯(a, λ)
[
B¯(b, λ)± B¯(b′, λ)
]
ρ(λ) dλ (6)
and notes that, since |A¯(a, λ)| ≤ 1,
|E(a, b)± E(a, b′)| ≤
∫
|B¯(b, λ)± B¯(b′, λ)| ρ(λ) dλ, (7)
and by the same reasoning,
|E(a′, b)∓ E(a′, b′)| ≤
∫
|B¯(b, λ)∓ B¯(b′, λ)| ρ(λ) dλ. (8)
Finally, since |B¯(b, λ)| ≤ 1,
|B¯(b, λ)± B¯(b′, λ)|+ |B¯(b, λ)∓ B¯(b′, λ)| ≤ 2, (9)
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so by adding Eqs. (7) and (8), and recalling that ρ(λ) is normalized, one arrives at
|E(a, b)− E(a, b′)|+ |E(a′, b) + E(a′, b′)| ≤ 2. (10)
This shows that any local theory, i.e., any theory satisfying factorizability (used in the
second line of Eq. (5)), must also satisfy the inequality (10).4
To connect this with quantum mechanics, one notes that the quantum prediction
for the expectation value in Eq. (3) is given by
EQM(a, b) = − cos(θ) (11)
with θ the angle between a and b. Then, if one takes a, a′, b, b′ on the same plane, with
a 90o angle between a and a′ and b and b′, and a 45o angle between a and b,
|EQM(a, b)− EQM(a, b′)|+ |EQM(a′, b) + EQM(a′, b′)| = 2√2. (12)
Since 2
√
2  2, it is clear that the local theories under consideration make predictions
for these experiments that are incompatible with those of quantum mechanics. We
conclude, then, that local theories cannot always make the same predictions as quantum
mechanics.
The final step is to take into account the experiments we mentioned in the in-
troduction. Those experiments have strongly corroborated the quantum predictions,
establishing, on the way, clear violations of the inequality. It seems, then, that local
theories are unable to correctly describe the world we live in: our universe appears to
contain non-local features.
2.2 Factorizability and local causality
Before exploring in detail SI, and the possibility of rejecting it, we make a few com-
ments regarding the relation between locality and factorizability that will be relevant
later on. As we saw above, the key condition used to derive the Bell inequality is
factorizability. While, initially, such a condition was assumed by Bell at the onset as a
defining characteristic of local theories, in later presentations of the inequalities, Bell
regarded factorizability as derivable from what he called the principle of local causality
4This particular inequality—known as CHSH because it was derived in [13] by Clauser, Horne,
Shimony, and Holt—is not the one Bell derived in his first proof. The derivation of the original
inequality requires an extra assumption of exact anticorrelations for runs in which a = b.
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(see, e.g., [10]).
According to such a principle, a model is local if the probability it assigns to bχ,
the value of some beable5 or property at the space-time event χ, is such that
P (bχ|λσ) = P (bχ|λσ, bξ), (13)
with λσ a complete specification of the physical state on σ, a spatial slice fully covering
the past light cone of χ6, and bξ the value of any beable or property on an event ξ,
space-like separated from χ and outside of the causal future of σ (see Figure 1). That
χ
ξ
σ
Figure 1: According to Bell’s principle of local causality, a theory is local if P (bχ|λσ) =
P (bχ|λσ, bξ).
is, for local models, if complete information on a slice of the past light cone of an
event is available, then, new information regarding happenings on regions outside of
the future of such a slice cannot alter the predictions of the model regarding that event.
It is important to point out that this definition of locality presupposes that all beables
are local (e.g., it assumes there is such a thing as bχ, a beable at χ, or λσ, the complete
state on region σ). In fact, it seems impossible to construct a notion of locality without
assuming the existence of at least some local beables (and it is not clear what role could
non-local beables play in a local model).
Bell makes two important remarks regarding this principle. First, that it is crucial
for ξ to lie outside of the causal future of σ. Second, that it is crucial for events in σ
5The beables of a theory, a concept introduced by Bell, are those entities in it “which are, at least
tentatively, to be taken seriously, as corresponding to something real” [10].
6Technically speaking, one requires σ to be such that χ lies on its future domain of dependence,
D+(σ).
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to be specified completely [10]. If either of these two things fails to obtain, then, even
for a local theory, ξ could provide information about χ (if the description in σ is not
complete, ξ could complement it; if ξ does not lie outside of the causal future of σ,
then, in an indeterministic theory, a stochastic process in the future of σ, but in the
common past of χ and ξ, could correlate them; for details, see [29, p.16]).
In order to explore the relation between factorizability and local causality, we con-
sider Bell’s experimental scenario (see Figure 2). First we note that, while the principle
1 2
A B
a b
λΣ Σ
Figure 2: Space-time diagram of Bell’s experimental scenario.
considers a situation in which σ is completely contained on and within the past light
cone of χ, Bell’s scenario is such that complete information is provided on a full hyper-
surface Σ, extending all the way to infinity. This allows to consider models that contain
so-called non-local beables (such as the wave function, which presumably, at least par-
tially, describes the state, and is not associated with a particular space-time region,
but to the whole hypersurface). Second, we note that, while the principle considers
any beable outside of the future of σ, in this scenario, we only consider probabilities
conditionalized on the particular set of parameters, A,B, a and b. The question, then,
is if these differences could lead to trouble; that is, if the application of the modified
criterion could fail in capturing local models as intended.
The answer is that there is nothing to worry about because, by allowing the in-
troduction of information from outside of the past light cone, and by only considering
conditionalizations over a few parameters, the criterion turns into a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for locality. That is because, while of course all local theories are
such that their probabilities are not altered by specifying additional information of
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the sort considered in Bell’s principle7 (the condition is necessary), it is also the case
that not all non-local theories are such that their probabilities are in fact altered by
the particular new information provided by the result and setting on the other side
(the condition is not sufficient).8 Then, all local theories, together with some non-local
ones, will satisfy it. As a result, if, with Bell, what we want is to use the principle
to apply to all local theories, then the modified version will do so perfectly well. Of
course, some non-local theories will be taken for the ride, but that is not a problem.
Now, to derive factorizability from local causality, we first consider the joint prob-
ability P (A,B|a, b, λΣ), with λΣ the complete state over Σ, and write it as follows
P (A,B|a, b, λΣ) = P (A|a, b, B, λΣ)P (B|a, b, λΣ), (14)
Next, from the principle of local causality, we see that
P (A|a, b, B, λΣ) = P (A|a, λΣ) and P (B|a, b, λΣ) = P (B|b, λΣ), (15)
from which it follows that
P (A,B|a, b, λΣ) = P (A|a, λΣ)P (B|b, λΣ). (16)
This sure looks a lot like factorizability, but we are not there yet. The problem is that,
while factorizability, as used in the derivation of the theorem, is written in terms of the
state of the pair, λ, the equation above is written in terms of λΣ, which, as we said, is
the state on the whole hypersurface Σ. Why is this difference important? It is because
λΣ does not satisfy the equation analogous to SI, i.e., Eq. (2) with λ substituted by
λΣ, that would be necessary to derive the inequality. That is, a and b are in general
correlated with λΣ (e.g., in a deterministic theory, Σ determines a and b, so they surely
are not independent; and even in a non-deterministic theory, one would expect some
degree of correlation).
How, then, do we obtain factorizability? To do so, we first note that λΣ can be
decomposed into four (not necessarily independent) parts: λ (describing the physical
state of the particle pair to be measured), λa (influencing or determining the setting
7That is, information from outside of the causal future of the intersection between Σ and the past
light cone of regions 1 and 2, respectively.
8In fact, if indeed the information on Σ is complete, all deterministic non-local theories will satisfy
the criterion; in due time we will relax this to include all sorts of non-local theories.
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a), λb (influencing or determining the setting b), and λE (which includes everything
else). As a result, we can write Eq. (14) as follows
P (A,B|a, b, λ, λa, λb, λE) = P (A|a, λ, λa, λb, λE)P (B|b, λ, λa, λb, λE). (17)
Now, since λa and λb only influence the measurement through a and b, they are re-
dundant and can be removed. Likewise, λE is irrelevant by definition, so it can also be
removed. With this, we finally arrive at
P (A,B|a, b, λ) = P (A|a, λ)P (B|b, λ), (18)
that is, factorizability.9
Before moving on, it is instructive to compare our derivation of factorizability from
Bell’s principle of local causality to that of Bell himself in [10]. As we do in Eq.
(17), Bell divides the information in the conditional into different terms: a, b, c and λ
(see Eq. (9)). According to Bell, c represents values of other variables describing the
experiment; however, he assumes that c and λ give a specification which is complete,
at least for the intersection of Σ with the union of the past light cones of regions 1
and 2 (see Figure 2). It seems, then, that c contains much more than a description of
the experiment and is much closer to what we call λE. At that point, and in contrast
to what we do, Bell does not attempt to remove c from the conditional and keeps it
through the derivation of the theorem. Moreover, he assumes that c remains constant
throughout the whole experiment (see, e.g., his Eq. (11)). Given that c is required
to contain much more information than the experimental arrangement, the assumed
constancy of c seems unwarranted, and potentially problematic (we will have more to
say about this point in the next section).
3 Settings Independence
We already saw that, in order to derive a conflict between local theories and quantum
mechanics, SI needs to be assumed. Initially, SI was only implicitly imposed by Bell,
but a few years later Clauser and Horn realized that such an assumption was indepen-
dent of locality and made it explicit (see [12, fn. 13]). To illustrate the fact that SI
9Note that, by removing λE from the conditional, the criterion is no longer automatically satisfied
by deterministic non-local theories (see fn. 8).
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and locality are independent, Shimony, Horne and Clauser consider in [35] a scenario
in which a set of experimental data for a Bell-type experiment, displaying quantum
correlations, is fabricated. The results of the set are then sent to an unscrupulous ap-
paratus manufacturer that programs two apparatuses to display the concocted results.
The settings are likewise sent to the complicit assistants of two experimentalists. Fi-
nally, when the experimentalists perform the measurements, their assistants persuade
them to use the fabricated settings for each run and, when the data is recorded and
analyzed, results that violate Bell inequalities are uncovered. The Bell inequalities are
then violated, even though all processes involved are fully local.
As we explained above, SI consists of the assumption that the distribution of phys-
ical states that characterizes the set of measured systems, ρ(λ), and the measurement
settings, a and b, are statistically independent: ρ(λ|a, b) = ρ(λ). That is, one assumes
that, if out of the whole ensemble of measured pairs, one focuses on a subensemble of
runs with any particular pair of settings, then the distribution of λ over that subensem-
ble is the same as the distribution of the whole. It is easy to see that this is employed
in the derivation of the inequality in, e.g., Eq. (6).
There are a number of confusions in the literature regarding the exact nature and
meaning of SI. The first we want to mention has to do with the fact that SI is often
presented as a claim regarding the freedom of the experimenter to choose the settings
(see, e.g., [8]). This has led to the impression that SI has something to do with the
existence of free will (or lack thereof). It should be clear, however, given the description
given above, that SI has nothing to do with questions regarding the existence of true
free will. Of course, since SI is the assumption that there is no correlation between λ
and the settings, the issue arises whether experiments can be carried out, such that SI
is satisfied—and this is a very important question, to which we come back soon—but
such a question is clearly independent of the free will issue.
Another possible misunderstanding might arise from the fact that ρ(λ) is often
portrayed as a probability distribution. We believe, however, that it is helpful to keep
in mind that it represents the actual distribution of states over the measured ensemble.
If ρ(λ) is thought of as a probability distribution, then one could reasonably ask:
probability conditional on what? Given that we do not have an explicit theory for λ,
then it, in fact, could depend on many things, such as the temperature of the lab, the
time of the experiment, etc. If so, then one could find it hard to believe, not only that
it remains constant when different settings are employed, but that it remains constant
over time at all. For instance, in [10] Bell explicitly writes the dependence of λ on c
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(see his Eq. (12)). However, as we explained, and, in contrast to what Bell does in that
article, we consider it unjustified to assume that c remains constant throughout the
experiment. If ρ(λ) is identified, not with a probability distribution, but with the actual
distribution over the measured ensemble, then the issue becomes much more tractable.
Another potential problem in regarding ρ(λ) as a probability distribution is that one
could claim that, since the theory controlling λ could be anything, then we should not
impose on it the requirement that it employs classical probabilities: e.g., we should
not impose on ρ(λ) to obey classical probability rules. This, of course, becomes a non-
issue once one recognizes that ρ(λ) is basically a histogram of the actual distribution
of λ over the actual experimental ensemble. Of course, there is a relation between the
details of a model, the probability it assigns to a given λ in a particular circumstance,
and the actual ρ(λ) that is produced on a particular experiment. The point we are
making is that such details are irrelevant for the construction of the inequality.
Yet another confusion regarding the nature of SI has to do with ignoring the dis-
tinction between λ, the state of a pair, and λΣ, the state over the whole hypersurface
Σ. As we explained above, in general, a and b are correlated with λΣ, so it is clear
that the analogous of SI, with λΣ substituted for λ, is not satisfied for λΣ. The idea
behind SI, then, is that, out of all the degrees of freedom over Σ, there is a subset,
which we call λ, that not only completely characterizes the pair, but that can be made
independent of the subsets of λΣ, λa and λb, influencing or determining the settings.
Is this an acceptable assumption? We turn to that question next.
3.1 Justifying Settings Independence
As we mentioned above, the key question to explore the reasonableness of SI is whether
there are designs for Bell-type experiments that make it safe to assume that SI is in
fact satisfied. In this regard, what one does—in physics and elsewhere in science—is
to employ some sort of randomization or pseudo-randomization process. In clinical
trials, for example, one takes special precautions to guarantee that the sample under
scrutiny is representative of the whole population one is trying to study. One usually
achieves this by using some sampling method that (pseudo-)randomly selects members
from the target population. Likewise, in Bell-type experiments, measurement settings
are usually chosen by a random or pseudo-random number generator. Alternatively,
more complicated mechanisms have been employed for the selection of the settings.
For example, these have been chosen via pseudo-random processes involving the digits
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of pi and popular TV shows and movies [34], photons from Milky Way stars [22] or
distant quasars [30], and input from around 100,000 volunteers from all over the world
[1].
Do these elaborate methods guarantee randomness, at least at the required practical
level for SI to be satisfied? It is quite reasonable to believe so. Otherwise, one would
have to postulate utterly surprising correlations between seemingly independent degrees
of freedom. In fact, it is well known that, unless there is a specific mechanism to
maintain a given correlation, the generic dynamics of all but the simplest systems will
quickly wash out correlations between any small subset of separated variables. This
seems to be so even for fully deterministic theories with no fundamental randomness.
Furthermore, if the pseudo-random process employed to select the settings is controlled
by a given immutable sequence—say, a device that selects angles depending on the
evenness or oddness of digits of pi—then the possibility of a common cause explanation
for a possible correlation between the settings and λ appears to be ruled out because
nothing in the past of the system could influence the digits of pi.10 This is what Bell
himself had to say about all this in [9]:
Consider the extreme case of a ‘random’ generator which is in fact per-
fectly deterministic in nature—and, for simplicity, perfectly isolated. In
such a device the complete final state perfectly determines the complete
initial state—nothing is forgotten. And yet for many purposes, such a de-
vice is precisely a ‘forgetting machine’. A particular output is the result
of combining so many factors, of such a lengthy and complicated dynami-
cal chain, that it is quite extraordinarily sensitive to minute variations of
any one of many initial conditions. It is the familiar paradox of classical
statistical mechanics that such exquisite sensitivity to initial conditions is
practically equivalent to complete forgetfulness of them.
To illustrate the point, consider an ensemble of frictionless, perfectly elastic pool
tables, each with 16 balls: one white and 15 numbered. The situation in each table is
fully deterministic, with the initial positions and velocities determining the exact state
of motion of all balls at all times. Assume that in all tables, all numbered balls are
placed at rest at identical positions and that all white balls start with the same speed,
but different directions. The ensemble of tables, then, is described by a distribution
over such initial directions. Now, it is clear that there are strong correlations between
10This is a point raised by Tim Maudlin in an online conversation with Gerard ’t Hooft.
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all tables in the ensemble, as the complete situation is fully parametrized by time
and the initial angle. In particular, there is a simple, perfect correlation between all
tables that is easy to write: the sum of the kinetic energies of all balls in each table
will be the same for all tables, at all times. Imagine, however, that we exclude from
consideration a couple of balls, say, those with numbers 14 and 15. What kind of
correlation will we find among the states of the different tables, e.g., regarding the sum
of kinetic energies of the remaining balls? It seems that the perfect correlation we had
before will be degraded dramatically. What happens if we now remove even more balls
from consideration, say those in the interval 8-15. The degradation in the correlations
would seem to increase and, probably, it would be hard to find any simple correlation
of any kind. What happens, finally, if we only consider a couple of balls, say, those
with numbers 1 and 2. Generically, one would expect for any correlations left to be
impossible to detect in practice. The idea is that there is a huge amount of degrees
of freedom, other than balls number 1 and 2, that would provide sufficient “padding”
between them, so there is no reason to expect a correlation.
Going back to the Bell case, think of the ensemble of pool tables as analogous to
the ensemble of experimental runs and think of the kinetic energies of balls 1 and 2, as
analogous to λ and the settings. Then, in the same way that one does not expect any
correlations between the kinetic energies of balls 1 and 2, in the Bell case, which clearly
involves something much more radical than the pool tables, with an inconceivably
large number of degrees of freedom being ignored, one does not expect any correlations
between the state λ and the settings (or whatever is used to determine them, e.g.,
photons from Milky Way stars or input from people from all over the world). And
this is so even if the universe is fully deterministic, with correlations originating since
the beginning—just as in the pool tables example above. It seems quite reasonable,
then, to assume that the settings are sufficiently independent of λ, making SI accurate
enough for the inequality to follow. That is, λE is expected to be so big, that it provides
sufficient “padding” between λa and λb (on the one hand) and λ (on the other) so there
is no reason to expect correlations between a and b.
All these arguments in favor of SI seem fairly solid; still, some have tried to resist
them. In what follows, we consider one proposed avenue for rejecting SI: superdeter-
minism. We then delineate some of the worries usually associated with such a path.
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3.2 Superdeterminism
The arguments in favor of SI appear to be quite strong. Still, strictly speaking, they
are not conclusive. After all, it might be that the ideas about effective randomness
described above, which appear reasonable, are ultimately wrong. Or that, for some
unknown reason, they do not apply to the particular Bell-type cases under considera-
tion. That is, it might be that, no matter how hard we try to make λ and the settings
independent, they are still correlated. A conspiracy appears to be required for this
to happen, but the truth is that there is no way to prove that no conspiracy of that
sort is behind the breaking of the Bell inequality. That is, a non-local world and a
local-but-conspiratorial one can be completely indistinguishable at the empirical level.
Moreover, a conspiracy might appear to be required only because we have not been
able to uncover the mechanism that preserves the required correlations. After all, λ
and the settings do share a common past (and future) that could explain a breakdown
of SI. What about the argument that no common cause could explain the correlations
once we select settings using a predetermined, timeless sequence, such as pi? Such an
argument is not conclusive because, in the design of any experiment using randomizers,
there will be something or someone arranging things up in a way that correlates the
settings to that particular sequence; hence, it is still possible to deny SI because there
could be a correlation between λ and the decision to arrange things that way.
This sort of considerations, often enhanced by strong intuitions regarding the ne-
cessity of preserving locality, has led to efforts to reject SI. Broadly speaking, two
strategies have been proposed to accomplish this. The first one, usually referred to as
superdeterminism, consists of denying SI by postulating that something in the (pos-
sibly distant) past ensures that the settings and λ are correlated. The other option
is to consider the possibility of retrocausality, i.e., that causal influences can travel to
the past. If so, one could use these influences to the past to explain a breakdown of
SI. Retrocausality was first considered in [14] in the context of the EPR argument and
years later presented as an alternative to the non-local consequence of Bell’s theorem
[15]. If causal influences are allowed to travel to the past, then the measurement of,
say, the spin of particle 1 along a, might influence the state of λ when it was created.
Then, such an influence on λ would have an impact on particle 2. By this causal zigzag,
the Bell statistics would be locality explained (see [46] for a recent review). In this
work, we do not explore the retrocausal alternative at all; in fact, we assume that no
retrocausal mechanisms are at play and focus exclusively on superdeterminism.
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As we explained above, superdeterminism maintains that λ and the settings are
correlated because of certain conditions of the past. And this is postulated to be so,
even if the method for choosing the settings is so complicated, and involves such a high
sensitivity to small perturbations, that ordinarily it would be rendered as effectively
random. That is, regardless of the randomization method employed, superdeterminism
postulates the settings to be determined by the conditions at some past time, and to
be distributed in such a way that they always produce the correct statistics in Bell-
type experiments. For instance, in the case in which the settings are chosen employing
photons from quasars, such photons would have to be perfectly coordinated with the
states of the measured pairs to guarantee, via purely local processes, that the correct
results are always produced.
In recent years, this position has gained some notoriety because of Gerard ’t Hooft’s
endorsement within his cellular automaton program [40]. For years, he has been trying
to come up with a modification of quantum theory that is deterministic and fully
local—among other characteristics (see [33] for a list of his theoretical requirements).
The idea is to maintain locality by denying SI via superdeterminism [33, p. 14]. What
reasons does he have to deny SI? He has said many things over the years. For example,
that determinism is incompatible with SI [38, p. 2-3], that SI assumes the existence of
free will [39, p. 3-4], that the postulation of a new law of nature is enough to violate SI
[39, p. 12], or that the evolution laws of the system might be involved in the violation
[37, p. 10]. As it should be clear by now, the first two points are red herrings that have
nothing to do with SI (see section 3 above), while the last two are more like aspirations
or strategies that he would like to see fulfilled than arguments in favor of his position.
There are, however, strong intuitions against superdeterminism. For instance, this
is what Shimony, Horne, and Clauser had to say about the approach [35]:
We cannot deny such a possibility. But we feel that it is wrong on
methodological grounds to worry seriously about it if no specific causal
linkage is proposed. In any scientific experiment in which two or more
variables are supposed to be randomly selected, one can always conjecture
that some factor in the overlap of the backward light cones has controlled
the presumably random choices. But, we maintain, skepticism of this sort
will essentially dismiss all results of scientific experimentation. Unless we
proceed under the assumption that hidden conspiracies of this sort do not
occur, we have abandoned in advance the whole enterprise of discovering
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the laws of nature by experimentation.
It seems, then, that there are important hurdles for the superdeterminism program.
To begin with, it is true that the arguments in favor of SI are not decisive. However,
the mere possibility of these arguments being wrong does not automatically make the
skeptic position interesting. In the absence of an explanation of why one could expect
the arguments to fail, or a concrete physical model in which they do so, the skeptic po-
sition seems weak. It is also true that a non-local world, and a local-but-conspiratorial
one, can be empirically indistinguishable, but that, by itself, is not impressive; all sorts
of extravagant worlds that are indistinguishable from ours can easily be concocted (e.g.,
one in which inert pink dragons appear in the sky when nobody is looking). In sum,
in the absence of a workable superdeterministic model, the approach seems to lose all
strength.
Moreover, there are strong intuitions to the effect that, even if superdeterministic
models could be built, they would require such complex initial conditions that they
would be useless in practice. In other words, the initial state required to explain
the correlations would need such a level of detail in its prescription—involving the
specification of such a large number of quantities to such levels of precision—that,
even if possible in principle, these models would be unworkable in practice (see, for
instance, [24]).
Another worry associated with the construction of a superdeterministic model has
to do with a potential lack of explanatory power.11 In particular, it is feared that such
models would not be able to provide real explanations because all explanations would
boil down to properties of the initial state. That is, superdeterministic models would
only be able to assert that “things are as they are because the initial state was what it
was,” period. Moreover, it seems that all initial states required to provide explanations
would have to be fine-tuned, i.e., they would have to be chosen within a set of measure
zero (given a reasonable measure over the space of initial states). As a result, the
explanations offered would be that “things are as they are because the initial state was
what it was (even though such an initial state was extremely unlikely).” That does
11Regarding the confluence of fine-tuning, Bell correlations, and explanatory power, the influential
[47] shows that every causal model that can reproduce no-signaling, Bell-inequality-violating correla-
tions, must violate a condition called faithfulness, which can be read as a condition of no fine-tuning.
It is important to point out, however, that faithfulness is in fact considerably stronger than what
critics of superdeterminism have in mind when they talk about fine-tuning. To see this, we note that,
while faithfulness judges as fine-tuned frameworks such as standard quantum mechanics or pilot-wave
theory, the worry regarding superdeterminism is precisely that it could introduce a sort of fine-tuning
not present in, e.g., standard quantum mechanics or pilot-wave theory.
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not seem like a satisfactory explanation. What is more, one would need a separate,
completely independent explanation of this sort for each different Bell-type experiment.
To say the least, that looks like an extremely inefficient way to try to accommodate all
the empirical evidence in favor of violations of the Bell inequality.
Finally, it seems that the proposed rejection of SI in order to save locality would, in
one stroke, jeopardize all experimental science. That is because an assumption anal-
ogous to SI is universally posited in all experimental scenarios across all sciences, so
a violation of SI would imply that the analogous assumptions would also need to be
questioned. If so, the conclusions of all sorts of experiments would have to be invali-
dated (e.g., all results from randomized clinical trials would have to be invalidated).12
If, on the other hand, the idea is that SI is only violated for certain experiments, such
as Bell-type ones, then, in the absence of a detailed explanation of why this is so, the
objection becomes plain silly—any unwanted experimental outcome could be discarded
this way.
In sum, the fact that the arguments in favor of SI are not conclusive, together with
strong intuitions regarding the necessity to preserve locality, have fueled efforts to reject
SI. One of such efforts involves so-called superdeterminism: the idea that correlations
can always be locally explained by considering conditions of the past. There are, on the
other hand, strong intuitions against the viability of a model of this kind. First, it has
been argued that, in the absence of concrete superdeterministic models, the skepticism
behind the project loses power. Second, that even if such models could be constructed,
the specification of the required initial states would be so complex that the model would
be useless in practice. Third, it is feared that such models would lack all explanatory
power. Fourth, and lastly, superdeterminism appears to jeopardize all experimental
science. We believe that the discussion between these two sets of intuitions has been
hindered, in part, by the lack of specific models that could serve as frameworks where
ideas can be examined in detail. However, as far as we know, up to now it was unclear
whether a manageable SI violating model can in fact be built.
In the next section, we present a model (and some variations thereof) that achieves
in detail all of the wishes of those seeking to trade SI for strict locality. That is, we
present a model that is fully local, involves violations of SI via the superdeterministic
path and reproduces all the predictions of quantum mechanics—including violations of
12This objection is what, presumably, Shimony, Horne, and Clauser had in mind in the passage
quoted above when they claim that “skepticism of this sort will essentially dismiss all results of
scientific experimentation.”
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the Bell inequalities. Moreover, we claim that our model fares significantly better than
expected regarding the worries usually attached to superdeterministic models described
above. In particular, we show that: i) the model can, in fact, be constructed; ii) the
conditions on the required initial state are not only not unmanageable, but rather
surprisingly simple; iii) as a result of such simplicity, the model has resources to retain
explanatory power and iv) because it is able to explain why SI is violated only for
Bell-type experimental scenarios, and not generically, the model does not threaten all
of experimental science.
Still, we find that the model gives rise to a number of unexpected complications and
we find that it performs rather poorly regarding theoretical virtues such as simplicity,
convenience and clarity. As a result, we end up concluding that our model—and
its variations—do not constitute strong contenders to existing non-local frameworks.
Moreover, we provide some arguments to the effect that, any model that achieves what
ours does, will have to share many of its central features. If this is true, our model
offers a quite general ground where the previous alluded discussion might happen, and
out of which rather generic conclusions might be extracted.
4 The local pilot-wave model
In this section, we present what we call the local pilot-wave model (LPW), which is
a fully local model that is capable of reproducing all quantum predictions. In or-
der to describe it, it is useful to first consider standard, non-relativistic de-Broglie-
Bohm pilot-wave theory. In such a framework, the complete characterization of an
N -particle system is given by its wave function Ψ(y, t), defined over the configura-
tion space Q with coordinates y, together with the actual positions of the particles
{X1(t),X2(t), . . . ,XN(t)}. The positions of the N particles can be represented by a
single point, Y (t) ∈ Q, the position of the so-called universal pilot-wave particle.
The wave function is postulated to satisfy at all times the usual Schrödinger equa-
tion,
i~
∂Ψ(y, t)
∂t
= −
3N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∂2Ψ(y, t)
∂y2k
+ V (y)Ψ(y, t), (19)
and the positions to evolve according to the so-called guiding equation,
dYk(t)
dt
= ~
mk
Im
 ∂Ψ(y,t)∂yk
Ψ(y, t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
y=Y (t)
. (20)
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The theory is clearly non-local since, according to the guiding equation, the velocity of
a given particle at a given time may depend on the position of all the other particles at
that same time. Note, however, that this non-locality only arises if the wave function
is entangled. That is, the position of a particle influences the velocity of another,
only if the wave function of those two particles is entangled. Otherwise, the non-local
behavior does not arise. In a Bell experiment scenario, the non-locality due to the
entanglement of the pair of particles explains the observed correlations. In particular,
assuming particle 1 is measured first, the setting on such a measurement, by affecting
particle 1, also non-locally affects the behavior of particle 2, leading to violations of
the Bell inequality.
The specification of the pilot-wave theory is finalized with the so-called statistical
postulate, which imposes that, at some initial time t0, the wave function was arbitrarily
chosen to be Ψ0 and the positions of the particles were randomly selected according
to a probability distribution given by |Ψ0|2. This implies, as a result of the evolution
laws, that particles at any other time t are distributed according to |Ψt|2. Such a
state is known as a state of quantum equilibrium. Furthermore, as a result of the
equations of motion and the statistical postulate, the theory imposes strict, in principle,
restrictions on the acquisition of information regarding the position of the particles
beyond quantum equilibrium. As a result, this theory is empirically equivalent to
standard quantum mechanics.
Since both of the evolution equations described above are deterministic, the pilot-
wave framework can be said to be deterministic. However, as we just saw, the theory
is not totally free of randomness. The statistical postulate implies an initial random
event: the selection of the positions of the particles. In a sense, then, all the randomness
displayed by the theory at the empirical level is pushed back to a single, master chancy
event at the initial time t0. After that, everything evolves deterministically. It is
worth mentioning that in [41] Antony Valentini argues for the condition of quantum
equilibrium to arise, not as a result of the statistical postulate, but as a result of some
sort of dynamical relaxation over time. Serious doubts, however, have been expressed
regarding the viability of that idea, and even about the possibility of constructing a
modified theory in which such an idea might be realized [17].
Before moving on, we comment on the ontology of pilot-wave theory. It consists
of a non-local beable, represented by the wave function, and a set of local beables,
the point particles. Out of those, the following mass density over physical space (with
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coordinates x = (x1, x2, x3)) can be constructed:
ρx(t) =
N∑
i=1
miδ(x−Xi(t)). (21)
Now, we would like to show how a “trick” can be employed to transform standard
pilot-wave theory into a fully local framework. Moreover, we will use such a frame-
work, and its variations, to exemplify different ways in which, by violating SI, a local
theory can lead to violations of Bell inequalities. We start with the first (and central)
version of the model, which we call LPWf (with f standing for field version). The
framework we have in mind contains, at each point x in physical space, a set of in-
ternal degrees of freedom. Such internal degrees of freedom are represented by a wave
function over an internal 3N -dimensional “configuration space” C with coordinates
zx = (z1x, z2x . . .), and a point Zx(t) ∈ C. That is, this theory contains at each point
in physical space a complete N -particle pilot-wave system. The state of the system
is then fully represented by a wave function field, Φx(zx, t), and a position field Zx(t)
(which might also be thought of as N position fields on an internal 3-dimensional space
{W1x(t),W2x(t), . . . ,WNx (t)}).
As for the dynamics, this framework contains, as standard pilot-wave theory, two
evolution equations: a Schrödinger equation for the wave function field,
i~
∂Φx(zx, t)
∂t
= −
3N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∂2Φx(zx, t)
∂(zkx)2
+ V (zx)Φx(zx, t), (22)
and a guiding equation for the position field,
dZkx(t)
dt
= ~
mk
Im
 ∂Φx(zx,t)∂zkx
Φx(zx, t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
zx=Zx(t)
. (23)
That is, the internal degrees of freedom at each point x behave in every way as an
N -particle pilot-wave system. The framework as a whole, on the other hand, is very
different from standard pilot-wave theory. In particular, the theory only contains local
beables, represented by Φx(zx, t) and Zx(t), and the evolution is ultra-local, i.e., all the
information needed to evolve the degrees of freedom at a point x is fully contained in
it.
A final element needed to fully construct the theory is a specification of a mass
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density in physical space given by
ρx(t) =
N∑
i=1
miδ
(
x−Wix(t)
)
. (24)
That is, of all the internal degrees of freedom at a point x, only very few translate
into the presence of mass at such a point. In particular, a point in physical space is
populated only if any of the point particles in its internal 3-dimensional space is located
at a point with those same coordinates.
Before moving on, we note that it is possible to generate an equivalent “particle”
version of the model, we call it LPWp, in which one attaches an “internal pilot-wave
system” to each of the N -particles that make up the system (rather than to all points
in space). Each particle then moves in physical space following its own image contained
in its internal system. We will see that LPWp has both advantages and disadvantages
with respect to LPWf . We take the latter as central in order to make the connection
with ’t Hooft cellular automaton more direct (see next section).
Going back to LPWf , we see that, for generic initial conditions Φx(zx, t0) and
Zx(t0), the model will surely not violate SI nor, being local, Bell inequalities. It is
easy to see, however, that a very special set of initial conditions, a set that seems to
be of measure zero for any reasonable measure over the space of initial conditions, will
exactly reproduce the behavior of standard, non-local, pilot-wave theory. If the initial
conditions happen to be homogeneous, that is, if they are such that both Φx and Zx
are exactly the same at every point x in physical space, then, even though the evolu-
tion is completely local, the behavior of the system exactly mimics that of standard
pilot-wave—including the capacity to violate Bell inequalities.13 This is because the
independent internal N -particle pilot-wave systems at different points will “magically”
coordinate and display all sorts of non-local correlations. It is as if every point in space
could be thought of as a supercomputer that is running a perfectly detailed simulation
of the entire universe. As a result, every point in space “knows” everything there is to
know about the whole history of the universe.14
13LPWp would show this behavior if every particle has the same internal wave function and config-
uration.
14We find it amusing that our model shares some features with Leibniz’s Monadology. For instance,
when homogeneous initial conditions are present, as a monad, each spatial point is a “perpetual living
mirror of the universe.” Also, as Leibniz’s pre-established harmony, homogenization in our model
makes causality redundant. There are differences, of course. For one thing, our model is about
physical entities, not psychic ones.
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All this is a concrete example of how the selection of fine-tuned initial conditions
can be employed to violate both SI and Bell inequalities. Note, however, that the spec-
ification of initial conditions required to achieve a breakdown of Bell inequalities is not
as complicated as one might have thought. Sure, it involves an enormous amount of
non-local correlations, but it does not involve an unmanageable amount of complexity
(more on this in section 5). To see that SI is indeed violated once homogeneous condi-
tions are provided, we note that the state λ of the particles involves the specification
of both Φ and Z in the region where the particles are created. But the homogeneity of
initial conditions implies that such Φ and Z determine such fields everywhere, includ-
ing in the regions where a and b are located. We conclude that, in this case, λ, a and
b cannot be independent.
It is interesting to note that this mechanism to break the Bell inequalities is in
a certain way analogous to the way in which, in pilot-wave theory, all indeterminism
is pushed back, via the statistical postulate, to the initial conditions, after which the
evolution is fully deterministic. In the present case, all the non-locality is inserted into
the initial condition; after that, the evolution is fully local.15 It is also worth mentioning
that a trick analogous to the one employed to construct our model can be used to
convert any deterministic non-local theory, even one with superluminal signaling, into
a local one. If the local theory is then provided with homogeneous initial conditions,
then it will exactly mimic the behavior of the non-local theory, including, if it is the
case, its capacity to violate Bell inequalities.
As we saw above, LPWf is such that, if homogeneous initial conditions are selected,
then, by violating SI, the model is able to break the Bell inequalities. We also note
that the set of initial conditions leading to such behavior is extremely easy to char-
acterize: the initial conditions must be homogeneous. This opens up the possibility
of introducing such a succinct characterization as a constraint on the allowable initial
conditions (see [45] for similar ideas). That is, if we stipulate, as an extra postulate of
the model, that the initial conditions must satisfy
∇xΦx = 0 (25)
15The extent of the analogy is limited to the fact that a certain non-intuitive feature of the theory
is moved from the time evolution to the initial conditions, but the particular feature involved in each
case is of course quite different.
23
and
∇xZx = 0 (26)
(with ∇x =
(
∂
∂x1
, ∂
∂x2
, ∂
∂x3
)
), then, for generic initial conditions, the model would re-
produce the behavior of standard pilot-wave theory and the Bell inequalities would
be violated. We call this version of the model with constraints C-LPWf .16 Following
the analogy between randomness and non-locality mentioned above, these constraints,
which introduce (effective) non-locality into an otherwise fully local theory, are anal-
ogous to the statistical postulate, which introduces indeterminism into an otherwise
fully deterministic theory.
For the final variation we explore the possibility of generating non-local correlations
dynamically. The idea is similar to what Valentini has in mind when he tries to dispense
with the statistical postulate and show that quantum equilibrium can be achieved
dynamically. What we propose is to introduce changes into the dynamics in such a
way that any gradients present in the initial conditions are dynamically suppressed.17
This could be achieved by the following modified evolution equations
i~
∂Φx(zx, t)
∂t
= −
3N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∂2Φx(zx, t)
∂(zkx)2
+ V (zx)Φx(zx, t) + iκ∇2xΦx(zx, t), (27)
dZkx(t)
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Φx(zx, t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
zx=Zx(t)
+ κ∇2xZx(t), (28)
with ∇2x = ∂
2
∂x21
+ ∂2
∂x22
+ ∂2
∂x23
and κ a real parameter (we call this model with dynamical
relaxation R-LPWf ). The idea, then, is to add terms to Eqs. (22) and (23) that
produce some sort of heat equation that could lead to homogenization of Φx and Zx
over physical space.18
A few comments are in order. First, in order to guarantee that ∇xΦx and ∇xZx
are driven to zero, and not simply to a constant, we assume that the space over which
the model is defined is closed and without boundaries (i.e., like a 3-torus). It is well
known that, under such conditions, the heat equation drives any initial temperature
distribution towards a fully homogeneous state. Second, the Laplacian in these equa-
16We note that for LPWp, the corresponding constraints would be less elegant. Instead of a simple
pair of equations, such constraints would require, for the full set of particles {1, 2, .......n...., N}, that
the internal wave functions and configuration are independent of n.
17Note that this breaks the analogy with Valentini’s ideas because he considers quantum equilibrium
as arising dynamically, but without any change in the dynamical laws.
18We do not see a simple way in which a similar trick could be implemented in the context of LPWp.
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tions must compete with the rest of the terms, so it is not clear that homogenization
will be achieved. However, it is reasonable to assume that if κ is large enough, then the
other terms can be ignored until approximate homogenization is accomplished. After
that, one can expect that the Laplacian terms could be ignored and that the dynamics
approximate that of Eqs. (22) and (23).19 Third, the diffusion terms added above,
just as those in the heat equation, permit instantaneous propagation, so they are non-
relativistic. The existence of an acceptable relativistic heat equation is an interesting
mathematical question on which, as far as we know, no definite consensus has been
reached. However, we must note that there is not only an active program searching
for such relativistic version (e.g., [27, 31, 3, 11, 26]), but also that, to the extent that
nature is susceptible to a mathematical description, it is clear that something like that
should exist. That is because both special relativity and the effect of heat diffusion
are, without doubt, a part of nature. Thus, a version of the above mathematical trick,
involving limited speed of propagation, must exist.
Finally, we note that, even if it is the case that, out of arbitrary initial conditions,
these equations lead to a suppression of ∇xΦx and ∇xZx, the system will not exactly
mimic a pilot-wave one. There are at least two reasons for that. The first is that, even
if the statistical postulate is enforced, the dynamics while the gradients are not zero
will not maintain quantum equilibrium. As a result, the dynamics after the gradients
are suppressed will mimic a pilot-wave system in which quantum equilibrium is not at-
tained, so the model will not reproduce the predictions of standard quantum mechanics
(unless, of course, Valentini is correct and equilibrium is attained dynamically). The
other reason is that in all these diffusion equations, like in the heat equation, the ap-
proach to equilibrium, which in this case is what generates homogeneity, is asymptotic.
As a result, at any finite time, some level of inhomogeneity will remain in the system
and the model will not really be empirically identical to a standard pilot-wave model.
This, of course, means that this model would be able to produce novel predictions,
which, at least in principle, could be experimentally explored. For instance, if the
experiments are repeated a sufficiently large number of times, one might expect some
failures in the exact correlations in Bell experiments when the spin of the two particles
making up the singlet are measured along the same axis or in the perfect correlations
in the three-particle GHZ set-up [20].20. At any rate, it is important to keep in mind
19We must admit that it is not clear how the system behaves when the various terms in the RHS
of Eqs. (27) and (28) become of similar magnitude.
20One should take these perfect correlations as a sign of the robustness needed to really achieve full
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that if this model can be built, even if it does not reproduce the predictions of stan-
dard quantum mechanics, it would be able to break the Bell inequalities by purely
local means, out of completely arbitrary initial conditions and without imposing any
constraints.
To sum up, we have constructed a fully local model that, when supplemented with
homogeneous initial conditions, exactly reproduces all the predictions of standard pilot-
wave theory—including its capacity to violate the Bell inequalities. This is possible
because the constructed model does not satisfy SI, an assumption necessary to derive
the inequalities. We have also described three variants, corresponding to different ways
in which homogeneity of the initial conditions could be attained: by putting it in by
hand (LPWf ), by imposing it via a law-like constraint (C-LPWf ) and by achieving it
dynamically (R-LPWf )—although in this latter case, the model is not truly equivalent
to pilot-wave theory. We also introduced a particle version of these models, LPWp, for
which the first two ways of achieving homogeneity seem readily available (regarding the
third one, the situation is not clear). We think these models provide a solid platform
in which the debate about the feasibility, benefits, and price of rejecting SI can be
framed. In the next section, we take the first steps in that process and consider some
of the consequences of our models for the general discussion regarding violations of SI.
5 Discussion
To close up, we start this section by assessing the behavior of our model with respect
to the standard worries leveled against superdeterminism. Next, we briefly compare it
with ’t Hooft’s cellular automaton proposal. Finally, we explore a number of lingering,
potential objections.
In section 3.2, we described how certain strong intuitions against non-locality have
inspired the superdeterminism program. Likewise, we explored some of the most im-
portant intuitions against the viability of such models. We concluded that the whole
discussion has been hindered, in part, by the lack of specific models, around which the
confrontation of these two sets of intuitions could be examined in detail. Of course, we
now have a model that could contribute to the analysis of the issue in significant ways.
Regarding intuitions against superdeterminism, we identified four: 1) that in the
absence of workable superdeterministic models, the project loses power; 2) that, even if
agreement with the predictions of quantum mechanics, as achieved by C-LPWf )
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a model could be constructed, the specification of the required initial conditions would
be so complicated that the model would be useless in practice; 3) that superdeter-
ministic models would lack all explanatory power and 4) that they would put in risk
all of experimental science. We begin this section by exploring how our model fares
regarding these intuitions.
Regarding the first worry, it is clear that we do have a working local model that
is, in fact, able to reproduce all the predictions of standard pilot-wave theory. As
for the second, it is also clear that the specification of the initial conditions required
to accommodate non-local correlations is not only not that complicated, but that it
actually is quite simple. Sure, the initial state required for LPWf to reproduce standard
pilot-wave theory must be chosen from a measure zero set, but we believe that there is
a useful distinction to be made between an initial condition of measure zero and one
that is so complicated that we would not even know how to write it down. The latter,
but not necessarily the former, would seem to add an additional layer of complexity,
making the model useless in practice.
The other two worries are more subtle; let us start with the charge of lack of
explanatory power. We saw that the fear is that all explanatory resources of superde-
terministic models would boil down to pointing to an extremely unlikely initial state.
Moreover, that one completely different such state would be required to explain each
separate phenomenon. Is this the fate of our model? It does not seem so. To begin
with, it is true, again, that within LPWf , the necessary initial state must be chosen
from a measure zero set. However, any initial state from such a set is able to explain
absolutely all violations of the Bell inequality. That is, our model does not require
different initial states to accommodate different instances of the violation.
Moreover, we saw that since it is possible to succinctly characterize the set of initial
conditions that leads to violations of SI, it is possible to postulate a constraint on the
allowable initial conditions. This implies that, for the model with such a constraint,
C-LPWf , the set of initial conditions that leads to violations of SI ceases to be of
measure zero—the desired behavior is actually fully generic within the allowed set of
initial conditions. This means that the explanation for the breakdown of Bell inequal-
ities within C-LPWf does not appear to involve fine-tuning. One might argue that
the transition from LPWf to C-LPWf does not seem like much of an improvement:
the distinction between selecting homogeneous initial conditions and enforcing them
through a constraint might seem a bit of a cheat. The important point to notice,
though, is that this trick is possible only because the required constraint on the initial
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condition is extremely simple and can be summarized by the succinct expressions in
Eqs. (25) and (26).
It is also important to mention that the change of measure over the space of initial
states, with the introduction of the constraint, is fully analogous to what happens in
other theories with constraints, such as gauge theories or general relativity (in the ADM
formulation). For instance, in Maxwell’s theory, only initial data satisfying ∇·E = 4piρ
and ∇ · B = 0 are physical, and thus are clearly of zero measure when considered as
part of the set of function pairs (E(x), B(x)). On the other hand, in the case of such
theories, the constraints emerge directly from fundamental symmetries. However, in
our case, they have been imposed in what seems a completely ad hoc manner, with no
independent motivation.
Finally, the model with dynamical relaxation, R-LPWf , would represent an impor-
tant improvement because it would predict observable non-local correlations, out of
generic initial conditions, without the need of introducing a constraint. That is, if it
works, the model would locally explain all non-local correlations, completely avoiding
the necessity to impose a particular type of initial condition. The problem, as we noted
above, is that there are some lingering issues to be clarified: the fact that it involves
instantaneous propagation (for which we think a solution ought to exist), the potential
of not satisfying quantum equilibrium and the fact that the homogenization at finite
times is only approximated, leading to deviations from standard predictions.
The last worry regarding superdeterminism was that such models could jeopardize
all experimental science because they would imply the breakdown of assumptions anal-
ogous to SI in other experimental scenarios. However, such a fear could be countered if
we could explain why, within our model, SI is violated only for particular experimental
settings, such as those considered by Bell, and not generically. To explore if our model
is able to provide such an explanation, it is instructive to explore the way in which
our model violates SI. After all, the model, given homogeneous initial conditions, is
empirically equivalent in all respects to standard pilot-wave theory. How is it, then,
that one violates SI while the other does not. The answer lies in the fact that, while
both models are fully equivalent at the level of the predicted mass density over physical
space, they are wildly different at the level of the remaining postulated ontology. This,
in turn, leads to a very different characterization of λ in each case.
In standard pilot-wave theory, the state of the measured pair is given by an en-
tangled wave function, together with the position of the two particles involved; that
is all. As a result, under standard experimental circumstances, one does not expect
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any correlation between such a state and the settings a and b. The situation with our
model, on the other hand, is very different. In that case, the theory is fully local and
separable. As a result, λ is composed of the values of the wave function field Φx and
the positions field Zx in the region in which the pair is created. The problem is that
such a λ, even though it is constrained to a small region, clearly is not independent of
a and b because, given the homogeneity of the initial conditions, from Φx and Zx on a
single point, information on Φx and Zx on all other points, including those related to
a and b, is available (that is, in our model, λ, λa, λb and λE are not independent; see
section 2.2). Clearly, then, SI is grossly violated.
Let us explore in more detail how Bell inequalities are violated in our model. As
we saw, one of the fears associated with violations of SI is its conspiratorial nature
and the fact that, given the myriad of convoluted methods employed to select settings,
models violating SI would have to involve even more convoluted details to explain the
observed correlations. That is, they would have to explain why the state of an entangled
pair is correlated with old TV shows or with photons from quasars. Our model has a
simple answer for these strange correlations: the state of an entangled pair is correlated
with old TV shows or with photons from quasars because, according to our model,
everything is correlated with everything! This simple answer to the presence of these
mysterious correlations, however, leads to an equally pressing question: if, according to
the model, everything is correlated with everything, why don’t we notice it? That is,
why such non-local correlations are only brought to light through highly sophisticated
experimental arrangements?
The answer is similar to the one given by, say, pilot-wave theory for why, even
though the theory is non-local, such non-locality does not manifest itself so easily. As
we explained above, within the pilot-wave theory, non-locality arises only for groups
of particles whose wave function is entangled. Similarly, in our model, even though,
at the level of Φx and Zx everything is tightly correlated, these correlations manifest
themselves at the mass density level, only when there is entanglement. As we men-
tioned before, our model is ultra-local. Therefore, the dynamics at each point x is
fully autonomous. Of course, due to the homogeneity of the initial conditions, this
fully autonomous dynamics is endlessly reproduced all over space. However, this does
not directly translate into observable correlations between different points because the
recipe to construct the mass density at each point in space in Eq. (24) implies that
different aspects of Φx and Zx determine the value of the mass density at each point x.
It is only when entanglement is present that the behavior of mass density at different
29
points “magically” coordinates to display correlations at such a level. In particular,
in a Bell-type experiment, the entanglement between the pair of particles, and their
interaction with the measuring apparatuses, lead to violations of the Bell inequalities.
On the other hand, in, say, standard randomized clinical trials, since no entanglement
is involved, no miraculous non-local correlations are expected, so it seems that those
results can remain solid. We conclude that our model is able to explain why SI is
violated in Bell-scenarios, but not generically.
One might think that the observations of the last paragraph open the door to
modifications of the model that relax the complete homogenization requirement and
restrict that to the realm of those variables that are entangled. However, as one does
not know a priori which variables might, through the course of time, get entangled, it
seems one has no reliable mechanism to ensure that the model reproduces quantum
theory under general conditions, other than to demand full homogenization. A related
point has to do with the fact that, generically, one expects things to get more and more
entangled with time, so it seems that our previous observation regarding the fact that
correlations only show up for entangled systems won’t be able to explain the scarcity
of such correlations. The point, however, is that, just as in the pool tables example
discussed above, one expects such correlations, involving so many degrees of freedom
to completely wash out (at least at the practical level) once one focuses on just a few
particular variables.
Before moving on to explore some potentially problematic aspects of our model, we
would like to contrast it with Gerard ’t Hooft’s cellular automaton program [40]. As
we explained above, ’t Hooft has been trying to come up with a deterministic and local
theory that could replace quantum mechanics. What we want to highlight is that our
model can be seen as a realization of this project. To see this, imagine the spatial points
x in our model, with their associated degrees of freedom, Φx(zx, t) and Zx(t), to be
taken as representatives of the individual cells of the cellular automaton envisioned by
’t Hooft. The main differences are i) that our cells are point-like while ’t Hooft’s cells
have some size, and ii) that, while in our proposal each cell is fully autonomous, in ’t
Hooft’s proposal individual cells might interact with neighboring cells. We think these
two differences might be erased through a rather simple modification of our model.
To deal with the first, simply fatten the cells by taking them associated not with
points x but with, say, cubes of side `P; at the same time, replace in the mass-density
described by Eq. (24), the delta function by an integral of such an expression over the
corresponding cell. To deal with the second difference, we can have the guiding wave
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function field Φx replaced by the corresponding averaged version over neighboring cells.
Finally, note that it is not only that our model realizes ’t Hooft’s objectives re-
garding locality, but that two of our paths to achieve homogenization of the initial
conditions—the postulation of a law and the dynamical approach—resemble his pro-
posals on how to deny SI, mentioned above. It seems clear, then, that our model can
be seen as a full realization of ’t Hooft’s ideas. Moreover, it appears that any model
capable of doing so would have to share with our model the (extreme) feature of having
at each cell full information of the whole system (or something very similar). This is so
because, as we saw before, one cannot know a priori which variables will get entangled.
All this implies that we can use our model to assess the alleged virtues and problems
of ’t Hooft’s ideas. In this vein, we close up by focusing on some objectionable aspects
of our model.
To begin with, we note that the ultra-local nature of our model—i.e., the fact that
the dynamics of the fundamental degrees of freedom Φx(zx, t) and Zx(t) at each point x
is fully autonomous—clearly implies the presence of an absolute rest frame that allows
one to talk about the same point in space at different times (note that an analogous
feature arises within ’t Hooft’s proposal regarding the cells). This unattractive feature
might be compared with the claim in [42] that a correct reading of standard pilot-wave
theory also implies the existence of an absolute rest frame. However, the difference
is that, even if Valentini is correct, there is no doubt that Galilean invariance is at
least an effective symmetry of the standard theory. Our model, in contrast, does not
respect Galilean invariance for generic initial conditions. Note however that, since
for homogeneous initial conditions, our model is, at the mass density level, equivalent
to the standard theory, then our model is consistent with Galilean invariance when
homogeneous initial conditions are present. All this is reminiscent of the fact that,
even though standard pilot-wave theory requires a preferred foliation of space-time,
as long as quantum equilibrium is present, such a foliation is not empirically accessi-
ble (note that, in our model, homogenization—plus quantum equilibrium—would also
block empirical access to the preferred foliation).
In sum, our model requires an absolute rest frame, and such a frame is empirically
accessible for generic initial conditions. Homogeneous initial conditions, on the other
hand, block empirical access to such a frame—as well as, if quantum equilibrium is
present, access to the associated preferred foliation. Similarly, standard pilot-wave
theory requires a preferred foliation, but quantum equilibrium blocks access to it. Now,
in the context of standard pilot-wave theory, it has been proposed that the preferred
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foliation could be selected dynamically [16]. It seems, however, that our model, having
the local beables themselves intimately associated with space points, would make it
harder for a process of that sort to work. Finally, we note that LPWp does not require
an absolute space. It is clear, however, that this particle version would not be very
useful for the construction of a field theoretical relativistic version (and, as we saw, the
dynamical relaxation method for achieving homogeneity does not seem readily available
for LPWp).
The next objection we would like to mention is also related to the ultra-local char-
acter of our model. The problem is that the autonomy of the dynamics at each point
seems to imply that an epistemic agent composed of a collection of such points would be
incapable of acquiring information from the outside, seemingly leading to a profoundly
solipsistic scenario. In a world described by our model, Descartes’ evil demon would
have an easy time deceiving us, with no need to substitute the input acquired by the
senses with something else—since there would be no input to begin with. Similarly,
a mad scientist would not require to provide electrical impulses to a brain in a vat in
order to simulate reality, and it would be easier for a Boltzmann brain to spontaneously
form. As a result, our model might seem to be empirically incoherent or self-refuting,
with a total disconnect between ontology and epistemology.21
Note, however, that the situation regarding this last issue is not completely clear.
In order to arrive at a conclusion regarding empirical incoherence, a full analysis of
the possible existence of epistemic agents within our model, and of their epistemic
capacities, would need to be carried out. Needless is to say, that is a formidable task
well beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, we should recognize that epistemic
questions of this kind could be raised in the context of many other theories, so we should
avoid demanding from our model more than what is usually demanded from others.
Still, there are a few things we can say, even in the absence of a full epistemological
analysis. If we restrict consideration to the situation where homogeneity prevails, and
21A related worry runs as follows: the fact that in our model each point contains information about
the entire universe, together with the fact that the dynamics at each point is ultra-local, invites one
to adopt a position in which all there is to the world is a single point. The lack of interaction between
the internal systems at different points certainly makes such a posture viable, but that would simply
amount to returning to standard pilot-wave, with its standard non-locality. Alternatively, one could
take the internal space to be a 3N-dimensional configuration space C (as is done in our presentation),
in which case the internal dynamics would be fully local (in that space). In that scenario, taking the
position that all there is to the world is a single point would lead to David Albert’s proposal in [2].
However, if one insists on having a theory that is local in ordinary space, then such an option would
be unavailable.
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make use of the fact that, under such conditions, our model coincides with standard
pilot-wave theory at the mass density level, we could simply “pass the buck” regarding
epistemic questions from the former to the latter. That seems like a very promising
path, except, perhaps, if we delve more deeply into questions regarding epistemic access
to the assumption of homogeneity itself. If, on the other hand, one would want to study
the theory in all generality, independently of the homogeneity conditions, then the issue
would become extremely murky and the risk of epistemic incoherence would persist.
The last potential problem we discuss has to do with what could be seen as an
unacceptable, gross enlargement of the ontology. Remember that our model substitutes
the standard pilot-wave ontology, consisting of one wave function and one position
vector (on configuration space), with a wave function and a position vector for each
point x in physical space (or one for each particle in LPWp). As we mentioned before,
the model could be thought of as containing at each point a supercomputer running
a perfect simulation of the entire universe. However, this, by itself, should not be
seen as a significant objection. First, proponents of any kind of hidden variable theory
are already well disposed towards an expanded ontology. Second, it is true that the
magnitude of this particular expansion might seem quite large, but, in fact, similar
enlargements of ontology have occurred elsewhere in physics, e.g., in the transition from
standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. It is clear, then,
that an ontological growth should not be judged alone: it must be weighed against the
full background of empirical and theoretical vices and virtues of a theory. That is,
it must be weighed, along with many other aspects of a theory, such as conceptual
clarity, simplicity, explanatory and unificatory powers, etc. (for instance, it is clear
that the ontological expansion in quantum field theory is tied to a spectacular increase
of explanatory power).
So, what can be said in this regard about our model? Is the enlargement of the
ontology in our case worth its cost in this sort of calculus? We seriously doubt it. The
only benefit of our model seems to be that it manages to preserve locality, but it does
so by, at the same time, seriously muddling its standing regarding clarity, simplicity,
explanatory power, etc. For instance, according to our model, there is a dramatic
disparity between the full ontology of the model and the part of the ontology that
manifests itself in physical space (via the mass density in Eq. (24)). That just seems
like an unnecessarily cumbersome way of doing things—particularly in light of other
theories that do the same in a much simpler way. It is not clear, then, why anyone
would choose our model over, say, pilot-wave theory. It might be argued that, by
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being local, our model considerably gains in unificatory power because it allows for
unification with relativity. This, however, depends on non-locality being incompatible
with relativity, an idea which is arguably mistaken (see, e.g., [25]). Moreover, our
model might be local but, as we just saw, it requires an absolute rest frame, so it does
not seem to be in good shape regarding its compatibility with relativity (as we saw,
LPWp does not require an absolute Galilean frame, but does not seem appropriate
for a generalization to a field theory). By the way, it is clear that a similar situation
holds in connection with ’t Hooft’s proposal. In that case, the preferred frame would
correspond to that defined by the world lines of the individual cells that make up the
global cellular automaton. It thus seems that if the aim was to construct a theoretical
framework that was fully in compliance with the spirit of relativity, the approach would
be self-defeating.
In sum, we have presented a model (and several variations thereof) that are fully
local but, by explicitly violating SI via the superdeterministic route, manage to re-
produce all the predictions of quantum mechanics (with perhaps the exception of the
R-LPWf version). Moreover, our model can do so without an unmanageably compli-
cated initial state, without fully losing all explanatory power, and without manifestly
rendering all experimental science obsolete. That is, our model seems to evade some
of the worst fears previously attributed to a potential construction of an SI violating
model via superdeterminism. In particular, within the model it is indeed possible to
succinctly characterize the set of initial conditions that lead to violations of SI, reducing
the risk of the model losing explanatory power. Moreover, the model explains why SI
is violated only in Bell-type scenarios, removing the potential threat to experimental
science in general.
Still, our model gives rise to a number of unforeseen difficulties, like the risks asso-
ciated with a possible disconnect between ontology and epistemology or the enormous
ontological increase, without any gain in explanatory power. We conclude that the
model simply “feels unnatural” and does not seem to possess the theoretical virtues
that would render it a serious contender to its non-local counterparts. In our view,
the price to pay to bypass the non-locality conclusion via this type of rejection of SI
simply seems too high. Independently of this conclusion, and having argued that local
models that reproduce all predictions of quantum theory via the superdeterministic
route must share many of the features of our model, we are convinced that the latter
can be very useful in providing a framework for further discussion of all these issues.
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